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Transnational Activism in Support of National Protest: Questions of Identity and Organization 
 
This article considers the question of whether transnational activism supporting national protest 
attains a cohesive collective identity on social media whilst organizationally remaining localized. It 
examines a corpus of social media data collected in the course of two months of rolling protests in 
2013 against the largest proposed open-cast gold mine at Roşia Montană, Romania, which echoed 
among Romanian expatriates. A network text analysis of the data supplemented with interview 
findings revealed concerns with protest logistics as common across the transnational networks of 
protest localities on both Facebook and Twitter, a finding that testified to the coordinated character 
of the protests. On the other hand, collective identity emerged as the fruit of attempts to surmount 
localized protest experiences of geographically disparate but civically-minded social media users. 
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The present article is an examination of transnational activism orchestrated by Romanian expatriates 
in support of a succession of environmental protests that took place in the country, in the autumn of 
2013. The primary aim of the investigation is to renew the scrutiny of transnational activism by 
querying the purchase that discursive transactions on social media by globally dispersed groups have 
on the formation of collective identities and organization (Russell, 2005; Bennett and Segerberg, 
2011; Bennett et al., 2014; Mercea and Funk, 2014; Theocharis et al., 2015). To that end, this study 
ascertains whether transnational activism in support of national protests may attain a cohesive 
identity on social media whilst organizationally remaining localized.  
One of the most effective (Parau, 2009) and storied environmental struggles in Romania 
(Mercea, 2014), the campaign against a planned cyanide-based gold mine at Roşia Montană grew 
over the span of more than a decade. Following the fall of authoritarian communism in 1989, 
environmental concerns occupied a notoriously peripheral place on the public agenda in Romania 
(Petrova & Tarrow, 2007). Environmentalism had been the preserve of professionalized, policy-
orientated non-governmental organizations (Börzel & Buzogany, 2010:718). Contrariwise, the 
campaign to prevent the development of the gold mine by the Toronto Stock Exchange listed Gabriel 
Resources was instigated by a small group of local property owners. It successfully litigated a series 
of planning permits in the Romanian courts (Salvaţi Roşia Montană, 2015) that forestalled the 
licensing of the mine.  
In the autumn of 2013, opposition to the mine reached a high point when concerted street 
demonstrations erupted in cities around the country and across the world. They lasted for more 
than two months from September to November 2013. The protests were sparked by a set of 
amendments to the country’s mining law proposed by the Romanian government granting extensive 
facilities to mine developersi. Opponents described the amendments as unconstitutional, in breach 
of EU norms and a gift to Gabriel Resources (Harosa et al., 2013). They were an outburst of brooding 
anger fuelled by the perception of unaccountability and corruption of state authorities colluding 
with commercial mining interests at the expense of the common weal (Wong, 2013) and engrained 
averseness to cyanide-based mining (Verseck, 2013)ii. The demonstrations were unparalleled for the 
scope of participation they attracted and their duration (Burean & Badescu, 2014). The amendments 
were rejected by the Romanian Parliament on 10 December 2013 (Nicolae, 2013).  
Especially striking about the 2013 protests were the solidarity events staged by Romanians 
abroad simultaneously with demonstrations in the homeland during the entire duration of the 
“Romanian Autumn” as the protests were dubbed by the press (Besliu, 2013). In late September, 
CNN reported that “the Romanian population has organized a global protest movement, taking place 
in over 60 cities across Romania and the world, ranging from Washington DC to Shanghai” (Besliu, 
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2013). Attempting to grasp the significance of this show of unity, one is reminded that Eastern 
European diasporas and particularly those residing in the democratic West have not exhibited an 
unalloyed appetite for the democratization of their homelands solely by virtue of their exposure to 
the political culture of their host countries (Koinova, 2009:42). Indeed, the Romanian diaspora 
displayed little enthusiasm for elections throughout the two decades of transition from authoritarian 
communism, turning out in modest numbers to legitimate the country’s budding democratic edifice 
with its vote (Burean, 2011:96).  
The article provides a network text analysis of transnational activism by Romanian 
expatriates who protested the amendments to the country’s mining law. Borrowing an analytical 
apparatus from social movement studies, I assay how geographically disparate groups of Romanian 
expatriates participating in the protests formulated their collective identity and organization on 
social media. Thereby, I depart from the more well-rehearsed concern with relations between a 
diaspora and its homeland (Alinejad, 2011; Graziano, 2012; Hickerson, 2013; Kang, 2009). Instead of 
a close inspection of an organization with a view to establishing how and with what success it 
championed an activist cause espoused by a diaspora (see Bandele, 2010); or to extricating 
conditions expeditious or otherwise to the mobilization and upscaling of a transnational protest 
(Koinova and Karabegović, 2016), the present analysis investigates the relations between activist 
groups that mobilized in the Romanian diaspora. 
In what follows, I explicate the relationship between identity and organization as delineated 
in studies of social movements and diasporas. I thereafter distil the scholarship on the digital 
dimension of collective action and transnational activism into three hypotheses for grappling with 
the 2013 mobilization. To that end and thereafter, a corpus of Facebook and Twitter data is analyzed 
that was retrieved from 34 Facebook event pages used to publicize the demonstrations in as many 
places worldwide and over 22 thousand hashtagged tweets collected between September and 
December 2013.         
 
 
Conceptual framework 
 
Social movement scholarship and diaspora studies both intimate close interconnections between 
collective identity and organization. Social movement studies have elaborated on the place of 
organizations in collective action. Organizations have been canonically regarded as a rational 
response to obstacles hampering the coalescence of discrete interests into a cooperative effort to 
secure a collective good (Baldassarri, 2009:394). The premise of this argument is that at a minimum 
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cost, organization delivers the collective capacity necessary to successfully pursue what are 
consonant but may otherwise be atomized interests. The definition has further been qualified by 
critics positing that the “social norms and sanctioning systems” (2009:394) that constitute an 
organization emerge through social interaction. Organization thus first materializes in the 
communication among individuals who signal their allied interests, beliefs or traits and their 
readiness to pursue them together (Bimber, Flanagin & Stohl, 2012:61). It is through communication 
that a contextually optimal combination of collective identity and self-interest engenders 
organization. 
Casting the analytical gaze back to Charles Tilly’s (1978) concept of catnets (short for 
“category networks”), which designates the cognitive construction of social relations among actors 
who enrol in collective action, one is reminded that identity-building and group development are 
collective processes intimately tied together. Closer to the present day, through the study of the 
Occupy Movement, social movement research exposed a horizontal mode of social organization 
pivoting on participation in the logistics and governance of the physical space and in political 
decision-making (Rehmann, 2013). Closely linked, the two varieties of participation were made 
accessible outside the physical confines of Occupy encampments via social media and other 
applications for networked communication, e.g. video streaming sites (Mercea, 2013). Equally, 
networked communication connected multiple participant constituencies striving for a collective 
voice of renewed solidarity whereby to confront third parties like corporations or governments 
(Rehmann, 2013:5-6). The apparent participation continuum from physical colocation to mobile and 
networked communication thus appeared conducive to the delineation of both the organizational 
boundaries and the collective identity of the Occupy Movement (Kavada, 2015:883).  
The same social movement literature alludes to the collective identity of social movement 
actors as being in flux (Gerbaudo and Treré, 2015). Amidst heated deliberations in the wake of the 
Arab Spring, one line of enquiry into the application of social media to collective action has pursued 
the question of social identity formation (McGarthy et al., 2014). The latter authors retrieved the 
notion of opinion-based groups to propose that an agreement on who was a common opponent (the 
out-group) constituted a social identityiii acting as the foundation uniting people in protest who 
otherwise may not “share their race, nationality, ethnicity or gender” (2014:729). That common 
understanding gained a vital momentum on social media at the outset of the uprisings (McGarthy et 
al., 2014).  
This is but one in a series of multiple instances of collective action where instead of being 
fundamentally reduced to a sense of attachment to a group, collective identity may be premised on 
a fellowship of shared aspirations or experience (McDonald, 2002; Verhulst and Walgrave, 2009). 
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Contrariwise, it has been suggested that publicizing personalized avowals of affinity to rights, values 
or experiences undergirding collective action on social media may not amount to more than 
tokenistic identity performance. In this account, individuals aggregated through a head-count on 
social media no longer partake in the fraught process of negotiating common aims, strategies, a 
mutual recognition or the reciprocity distilled into a ‘collective we’ of erstwhile collective identity 
(Milan, 2015:896). 
Whilst the latter may be a preoccupation that primarily bedevils activists (Bobel, 2007), 
research into opinion-based groups foregrounded the content of a social identity when enquiring 
how collective outcomes such as the mobilization in mass protests of large sections of people 
transpires who may neither regard themselves as activists nor define themselves as members of a 
definite social category—e.g. ethnic or national—for the purpose of their participation in collective 
action (Bliuc et al., 2007:20). Mobilization in social movements thus emerges as an upshot of social 
validation of personal assessments of “the way things should be” (Smith et al., 2015:544). The latter 
are personal conceptions of “injunctive norms” that feed into a fresh social identity negotiated, 
sanctioned or simply endorsed through social interaction (Smith et al., 2015:544).  Thus, it is through 
social interaction that social identity is formed which in turn can be intensified by rather than being 
entirely confined to a siloed domain of social media (McGarthy et al., 2014:737).  
Similarly, diasporas materialize around “an imagination of identity” that is not presumed but 
constructed and disputed (Sökefeld, 2006:267). In their study of the transformation of contemporary 
state actors in international relations, Adamson and Demetrou (2007:491) characterize diasporas as 
“deteritorialized and network-based collective identities” that embody distinct “organizational and 
spatial logics”. A diaspora encompasses collective actors dispersed across national borders who 
erect an “organizational framework and transnational links” that support membership cohesion 
premised on a shared national, cultural or religious identity; its interest representation and a 
connection with “a real or imagined homeland” (2007:497). Diasporas may assemble as networks of 
organizations and relationships articulated around a transnational identity open even to groups who 
“have not conceived of themselves explicitly as constituting a diaspora” and act as a vehicle for 
collective political action (Adamson and Demetrou, 2007:491). In turn, Koinova and Karabegović 
(2016) propose that diasporas can function as a lynchpin in transnational movements, playing an 
active part in their initiation and sustainment. They evince transnational activism as a variation of 
collective action that leverages cognitive, social or material resources to multiply advance a cause at 
levels of governance—local, national or international—where political opportunities are most ripe 
(2016:15). Diasporas can be instrumental to relaying such resources to best exploit those 
opportunities.  
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For collective actors to crystallize in the diaspora and take collective action on public matters 
touching on their group entitlements or governance in their host or homelands, a common ethnicity 
may not be sufficient or even entirely necessary (Wheeler, 2004). However, Ong (2003) 
distinguished a resilient essentialist “global ethnicity” among the Chinese translocal publics who 
mobilized online to protest against the discrimination of fellow nationals in Indonesia, in the wake of 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Translocal publics were “overlapping networks that cut across 
borders” bringing together co-ethnic groups (Ong, 2003: 87) around shared issues. Ethnicity, she 
contended, endures as a common identity denominator for otherwise assorted political 
constituencies. This may be the case especially when ethnicity is instrumentally conflated with a 
shared opinion so as to help protestors explicate their chosen course of political action (Bliuc et al, 
2012:2178).  Ong (2003:98) further argued that whist it was imperative to recognize the presence of 
ethnic overtones, it was notable that Chinese diasporic groups successfully resorted to a dedicated 
website (Global Huaren) to press civic demands for accountability on a national government.  
Recent evidence on the organization of collective action with social media, on the other 
hand, may appear inconclusive. First, Theocharis and his colleagues (2015:8) point to the 
conspicuous marginality of organizational talk in the Twitter communication streams associated with 
the Aganatiksmenoi (Greece), Indignados (Spain) and the US Occupy Movement. This, they assert, 
held true for both the orchestration of political actions (e.g. the planning of street protests) and the 
coordination of onsite protest logistics. The latter was a slightly more frequent activity accounting 
for 9 percent of the tweets that they surveyed as opposed to 7 percent dedicated to political actions. 
The findings nonetheless corroborate with a study of the transnational Occupy Movement evincing 
communication about protest logistics on Twitter to have preceded and informed on-site action 
(Bastos et al., 2015). Indeed, cognate research has found that both on Twitter and on Facebook, 
communication pertaining to protest logistics was especially robust (Mercea and Funk, 2014).  
The latter authors showed the discourse relating to the coordination of action resources to 
be consistent and proportionate across both platforms. They further uncovered that especially 
communication on Facebook groups reinforced the collective identities of protest groups (2014:21). 
Yet, in another albeit geo-spatial investigation into the Twitter communication associated with the 
US Occupy Movement, a pattern of localized activity was uncovered that was dedicated to protest 
logistics and the marshalling of tangible resources necessary to enact collective action (Conover, 
2013b). Such localized activity stood in contrast with the circulation of identity frames such as “We 
are the 99%” which was nation-wide in scope (Conover et al., 2013a). Indeed, it was suggested that 
social media were embraced by the Occupy Movement for the rapid, scalable although ultimately 
transient aggregation of masses of individual actors (Juris, 2012:260). Nonetheless, contextual 
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factors such as entrenched geodemographic divisions in a country as well as the political and socio-
economic prominence of a protest locality (ranging from socio-economic centres to remote rural 
areas, Bastos et al., 2014) circumscribe the use of social media in a protest.   
In light of these contentions, it was hypothesized that in the transnational mobilization 
against the proposed amendments to the Romanian mining law, organizational talk pivoted on 
concerns with protest logistics (H1a), on both Facebook and Twitter (H1b). Conversely, as the 
protests were a direct challenge to the Romanian government, collective identity was expressed in 
homologous (H2a), principally civic, terms across localities in the diaspora (H2b). Moreover, it was 
posited that collective identity concepts aided in bridging the loose social organization of translocal 
publics undertaking collective action, standing in contrast to the localized concerns with site-specific 
protest logistics (H3). 
 
  
Research Methods  
 
The general approach to the textual data garnered for this analysis was instrumental as proposed by 
Roberts (2000:262). Accordingly, the text under scrutiny was interpreted in light of a theory already 
held by the researcher. The possible entwinement of locality with identity and the organization of 
transnational activism by members of the Romanian diaspora on social media was probed through a 
network text analysis (Diesner and Carley, 2005). In network text analysis, texts are maps of words; 
words or phrases are abstracted as concepts as long as they pertain to a single idea. Network text 
analysis is predicated on the notion that language is a representation of interrelations among 
concepts (Carley, 1997:79) that may, inter alia, expose the nexus of social and discursive relations in 
a text.  
For the analysis, the textual data was aggregated into two discrete—Facebook and Twitter—
corpora. The Twitter data was gathered by querying the Search Application Programming Interface 
(API) for posts bearing the 7 main hashtags utilized in the protestsiv. The hashtags were identified 
through a key word search followed by the retrieval of hashtag streams and their close monitoring 
for the entire duration of the protests. This approach was made possible by the fact that the Twitter 
Search API returns results that are up to seven days old (Burgess and Bruns, 2012). It thus allows for 
historical queries whenever data collection does not coincide with the very moment a hashtag goes 
into usev. The resultant dataset comprised 22k tweets. The Facebook event pages were indexed in 
real-time on the official website of the “Save Roşia Montană” campaign. Diasporic activist groups 
were invited by the campaign to register their Facebook-advertised events with it. Textual data from 
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34 groups were collected and manually archived for analysis.  In the following step, each individual 
corpus was sorted, formatted and finally cleaned with the AutoMap text mining tool.  
In the course of the cleaning operation, a delete list was created for each corpus comprising 
“noise words” such as conjunctions or articles (Carley et al., 2013:269). To tackle the research 
hypotheses, I generated separate Facebook and Twitter semantic networks in the DyNetML format 
which included both in and out-links or edges among concepts. I subsequently analyzed the network 
with the sister package ORA. ORA is designed for the analysis and visualization of semantic network 
data (Carley et al., 2013). The Twitter semantic network had 12,488 nodes and 53,594 edges; the 
Facebook network had 21,038 nodes and 155,170 edges. I performed a number of complexity 
reduction operations on the data whereby, first, all isolated nodes were removed from the analysis. 
Subsequently, I retrieved the concepts in the data corpora pertaining to protest locales (e.g. London, 
Berlin) from outside Romania. This method for pinpointing protest localities was viewed as more 
reliable than the geocode information attached to social media data (Bastos et al., 2014); and, 
crucially, it was in line with the aim to probe associative frames connecting location with identity and 
organizational concepts.  
  I produced two discrete Facebook and Twitter locality networks on which I performed the 
analysis. I examined the locality networks both qualitatively and quantitatively. The qualitative 
component of the analysis involved a close reading of the data in order to classify identity and 
organizational concepts. This was done through inductive and iterative concept coding at text level 
with cognizance that the process may result in the cross-classification of some concepts (potentially 
interchangeably designating both identity and organization; Diesner and Carley, 2005). 
Quantitatively, I compared measures of degree centralization of the Facebook and Twitter networks. 
Earlier network studies of collective action have proposed that degree-centralized networks are 
particularly well-suited for communication and organization as key nodes can broker ties with all 
other nodes in the network (Oliver and Marwell, 1993). Accordingly, expecting that identities and 
organizational concepts may bear differently on the connectivity of the locality network (H3), I 
ascertained whether one or several concepts helped bridge the diasporic locality networks by 
measuring their betweenness centrality, or how often a node rests between two other nodes that 
are not directly connected to each other (Prell, 2012:104). Secondly, in ORA, I measured in-degree 
centrality to ascertain the evokability of identity and organizational concepts. In this study, 
evokability is the degree to which concepts link into a focal or measured concept (Carley, 1997:85)vi, 
or the interest that the latter receives. The expected outcome of the combined qualitative and 
quantitative analyses was a set of associative frames or “patterns of relations between concepts” 
which have network attributes (e.g. centrality) but no set meaning (Atteveldt, 2008:70). 
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Finally, I contextualize the ensuing findings with interview data. In the summer of 2014, I 
attended a meeting called by members of the “Save Roşia Montană” campaign with representatives 
of groups who had staged the protests abroadvii.  Twelve representatives and campaign members in 
turn narrated the experiences that had marked their participation in the protests. The testimonies 
made during the meeting amounted to a set of ethnographic interviews (Lindlof and Taylor, 2002). 
This second qualitative component of the analysis allowed for methodological triangulation and, 
thereby, a qualitative validation of the quantitative results (Lindgren and Lundström, 2011). In the 
process of indexing the accounts by the group representatives, I designed a pattern-matching 
protocol (Yin, 1994) whereby to distinguish similarities and differences in the articulation of 
collective identity and organization among the diasporic groups that took part in the protests.  
 
 
Results 
 
Excluding protest sites in Romania, there were 58 worldwide locations referenced with the Roşia 
Montană protest hashtags on Twitter. The scaled betweenness score for the transnational locality 
network was .687 suggesting an important concentration of ties around a number of cardinal nodes. 
The main protest hashtags acted as bridges between the various localities, having the highest 
betweenness centrality among concepts in the locality network (see Bar Chart 1 and Figure 1). The 
hashatags were thus a means to record the geographical span of the protests.  
      
Bar Chart 1 here 
The next step was to examine more closely the links between the protest localities and the 
concepts that connected them. The most cited ten locations in descending order were London, 
Skouries (Greece), Toronto, Paris, Berlin, Montreal, Dublin, Prague, Rome and Amsterdam. At the 
opposite end were Brussels, the Vatican, Aarhus, Ljubljana, Stuttgart and Montpellier with no more 
than 6 mentions. Most locations were either capital cities or important urban centres. The two 
notable exceptions of Kremnica (Slovakia) and Skouris (Greece) were gold-mining development sites 
where opposition groups had standing ties with the Roşia Montană activists in Romania.  
 
     Figure 1 here 
Apart from one cross-reference between Paris and London there was no evidence of direct 
links among the protest sites in the transnational locality network. Upon closer inspection, the 
Twitter accounts rosiamontanaint, alburnusmaior and lumif9 which had some of the highest 
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betweeness centrality scores in the locality network (see Chart 1), connecting to 16, 9 and 25 of the 
principal protest locations in the diaspora (see also Figure 1). If the first of these accounts was 
operated by a self-declared “international group founded in Brussels to facilitate coordination and 
communications between all groups and individuals fighting to protect Roşia Montană”, the latter 
two were the official accounts of the leading non-governmental organization in the Save Roşia 
Montană campaign and the personal account of a leading member of the campaign, respectively. 
Thus, rather than being an entirely horizontal structure, the links between the various protest sites 
worldwide seemed to be indirect, being centralized through the three Twitter accounts. The 
prominence of the two accounts associated with the campaign suggested that key actors in the Save 
Roşia Montană campaign were likewise brokers in the Twitter network connecting the transnational 
protest localities.    
Hashtags, on the other hand, were a discursive device acting as synecdoches for collective 
identity. Whilst unsurprisingly the principal vehicle for connecting localities, hashtags revealed a 
choice of concepts that underpinned an identity premised on solidarity with Roşia Montană. All but 
one of the protest hashtags (“#unitisalvam”) incorporated a direct reference to Roşia Montanăviii. 
Moreover, hashtags were key brokering concepts in the transnational locality network that often co-
occurred. The most frequently used hashtag, #rosiamontana (see Table 1), appeared more than half 
of the times (n=13,174) together with the #unitisalvam hashtag. The same hashtag occurred more 
than 95% of the times together with “#saverosiamontana”; alongside “#salvatirosiamontana” (91% 
of occurrences) and, finally, featured in 38% of the posts containing the #weloverosia” hashtag.   
The dominant identity concepts connecting the locality network portrayed the protests as a 
display of resistance to cyanide-based gold mining (see Table 1)ix. “Europe”, one of the frequently 
occurring identity concepts, educed a transnational dimension to the protests which, nonetheless, 
were not devoid of an ethnic character. The chief ethnic identity marker was the adjective 
“Romanian” (see Table 1). Whereas in terms of frequency and network centrality, ethnicity did not 
have a dominant position among the concepts contributing to an associative identity frame, it 
nonetheless was a more significant attribute of the protests than their European or transnational 
dimension. Lastly, two concepts— “Gabriel” and “parliament”— designated the out-group or the 
contenders who have divergent interests (Tilly, 1978:56) from the protestors, thereby evidencing 
that the associative frame indeed pertained to an opinion-based social identity.       
 
     Table 1 here 
In sum, the observed links between the principal identity concepts pointed to an associative 
collective identity frame that primarily publicized the civic and contentious (i.e. opposing cyanide-
 11 
 
based gold mining) character of the protests. In certain localities, the preeminent identity concepts 
were accompanied by other terms that helped expand collective identity. Illustratively, “green” and 
“global” were two concepts associated with the London protests; “corruption” and “environment” 
were concepts attached to the Paris mobilizations (the latter also to Montreal). In other words, 
whilst key building blocks of the collective identity were shared across protest sites thus verifying 
H2a, this was an identity predicated on a combination of hashtags and principally civic rather than 
ethnic concepts. The latter finding confirmed H2b. The communication orchestrated by the 
rosiamontanaint, alburnusmaior and lumif9 accounts fed into the same collective identity frame (see 
Figure 1).         
 
     Table 2 here 
Relative to identity concepts, organizational concepts had lower betweenness (Spearman’s rs =-
718, p<.006) and in-degree centrality scores (Spearman’s rs=-418, n.s.). They were thus less 
instrumental to connecting the locality network together, whilst garnering less attention than 
identity concepts. Organizational concepts reflected preoccupations as diverse as the weather in a 
protest locality; exchanges about landmark sites chosen for the weekly protests, (e.g. the Houses of 
Parliament in London, the UNESCO headquarters in Paris, the downtown area of Toronto) or the 
type of actions planned (London flash-mobs or candlelit vigils, demonstrations in Paris, petitions to 
the Canadian government). Importantly, corroborating H1a, the ego-networks of prominent protest 
localities on Twitter displayed many logistical concepts. However, tweets about more minor 
localities appeared to be hashtagged notices signalling that an event either had or would be taking 
place there.  
A concern that nevertheless received an important amount of interest across the diasporic 
locality network was that of chronicling the protests with photos and footage. The image and video 
narration of the protests fed into the overarching desire to portray a cohesive collective identity, 
suggesting that identity and organization fed into each other. As the Vienna group representative 
recalled, the group embraced an inclusive identity both on social media and during the street 
protests so as to enable the social organization of the protests by people who had not previously 
met or were not already sympathetic to the cause. As she explained,  
 
…what I really liked about our activities was that we removed any type of nationalism or 
Romanian identity and we made the protests open to all.  We wrote all our slogans in English, 
in German so that the public in Vienna or the guests from Vienna would not feel vexed by a 
local problem… this is one of the reasons why we got a lot of support from NGOs in Vienna.  
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On Facebook, the scaled betweenness score for the diasporic locality network was .150 which 
was significantly lower than on Twitter. Among the first ten concepts with the highest betweenness 
centrality were six protest localities from the diaspora (see Bar Chart 2). Further dissimilarities with 
Twitter were the higher betweenness centrality of locality concepts. Berlin rather than London was 
by far the most central diasporic protest hub on Facebook.  Indeed, the direct textual links among 
protest localities were far more visible. The first six cities with the highest betweenness centrality 
connected to 27 other localities excluding self-loops, the connection of a node to itself.  
      
Bar Chart 2 here 
Communication about the protest localities thus seemed to be predicated on more direct 
interconnections between them on Facebook (see Figure 2). Indeed, both representatives of the 
transnational groups and the Roşia Montană campaign in Romania avowed that Facebook was the 
most widely used social media during the 2013 autumn protests. Whilst none of the group 
representatives spoke of Twitter as having figured in their communication strategies, they recounted 
establishing connections among disparate localities through Facebook. For instance, following an 
incident between demonstrators and the police in Brussels which was streamed online, the 
Hannover representative got in touch with another compatriot who was calling for a demonstration 
in Hamburg on Facebook. They traded insights on Facebook on how to interact with law 
enforcement. Feeling reassured, the Hannover representative decide to go ahead and stage a 
protest in solidarity with Roşia Montană. 
     
     Figure 2 here 
The identity concepts encountered on Facebook and Twitter were comparable. The most 
recurrent such concepts expressed a vocal opposition to cyanide-based gold mining (see Table 3). 
The stem “gold” was a placeholder for both the precious metal and the mining developer at Roşia 
Montană, Gold Corporation or “Gabriel”. The same was true of the concept “exploitation”, a 
synonym for mining and/or the proposed gold mine which was used in Romanian. Ethnic identity 
referents (derived from the stem ‘rom’, ‘rum’) were directly associated with only three protest 
localities from the diaspora (Budapest, Bonn and Brno). The other identity tropes which reinforced a 
civic rather than ethnic collective identity are listed in Table 3.  
      
Table 3 here  
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On Facebook, there was a more explicit social identity binary representing the Roşia 
Montană protests as the in-group; and conversely, naming the Romanian Parliament, its special 
committee established to consider the amendments to the mining law and the mining company as 
the rival out-group. This dichotomous associative identity frame circulated on the Facebook groups 
of some of the most prominent localities in the transnational locality network, namely Berlin, 
London and Amsterdam, alongside the dominant frame of opposition to cyanide mining expressed 
with the concepts “against” and “cyanide”.  Likewise, the term activist was not employed self-
referentially on the event page. Rather, it was an attribute reserved to members of established 
groups or organizations. There was a shared interest on the Facebook groups to cite such activist 
entities who had either nominally backed the autumn protests or were called upon to support them, 
as was the case of Greenpeace international detailed below.   
The organizational concepts, on the other hand, reflected a foremost preoccupation with 
protest logistics. Organizational terms received far fewer in-links than identity concepts (Spearman’s 
rs =-253, n.s.) suggesting that, although at a non-significant level, their evokability was lower. 
However, the betweenness centrality of organizational terms was higher than that of identity 
concepts (Spearman’s rho=-123, n.s.), meaning that rather than garnering a lot of attention, 
organizational terms helped link together concepts, including protest localities. Illustratively, the 
terms “action”, “authorization”, “location” or “embassy” which appeared in conversations about the 
choice of protest sites and the question of whether to register a protest event with local authorities 
had comparatively higher betweenness centrality than the documented identity concepts. A kindred 
logistical concern among the diaspora was with turnout evidenced in the recurrent use of the 
concepts “gather”, “join” and “event” and their high betweenness centrality. It was accompanied by 
information on the scheduling of the protest events (on Sundays).  
From among the logistical concepts, the term embassy pertained to political action directed 
specifically at the Romanian state. The concept had a higher betweenness centrality than all other 
identity concepts, suggesting there was a marked interest among the diasporic groups on Facebook 
in the orchestration of protests overtly against the Romanian state. “Greenpeace” was another 
prominent example of a concept evincing political action that had a higher betweenness score than 
the identity concepts on Facebook. The environmental organization was cited either for the active 
role it played in lobbying against the law proposal in Romania or as the target of efforts to build a 
“green” coalition around the protests abroad.  
At the same time, many people shared photos and information on the protests which although 
not necessarily raising much interest as a topic, documented the protest actions across the diaspora. 
Moreover, a proposal began to be circulated on the Facebook groups of the diaspora in October 
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2013 asking members to take group pictures behind a banner featuring one or more words that 
would be collated into a message of solidarity with Roşia Montană. The idea, captured with the 
concept “banner” occupied a significant place in the communication on the Facebook groups. 
Indeed, it was the clearest illustration of a drive among the diaspora to undertake concerted political 
action, as detailed by the representative of the group in Paris:  
 
Seeing the scale of the protests globally, the fact that there were so many protests going on in 
various cities the world over we thought we should put together a common [Facebook] group 
with a few representatives… [to] design a common action that represents all of us and at the 
same time unites us all...[here] you can see the photo with the banner we did. 
 
Ultimately, whilst identity concepts were evoked in tandem with protest localities, 
organizational concepts were more important to bridging the locality network on Facebook. There 
were, nonetheless, exceptions to this prevailing relationship between identity and organizational 
concepts exemplified by the betweenness scores of the identity terms “activist”, “community” and 
“against”. It consequently appeared that whereas H3 was not verified in the case of Facebook, H2a, 
b had been validated. H1a was only partly supported by the evidence which revealed that at least 
two organizational concepts reflected attempts at concerted political action.  However, as the 
London representative implied, the particularly prominent concern with the orchestration of the 
protests flowed from the goal to maintain their appeal during the two-month period when they 
continued to be staged:  
 
…our objective was that each protest should bring something new, to run with a different 
topic or a different singular activity for it to be interesting for the Romanians and others who 
took part in the protests. 
      
Table 4 here  
 
In a final test of the third hypothesis, I ran a non-parametric Mann-Whithney U test to 
compare the centrality measures for the two types of concepts. There was a statistically significant 
difference in the in-degree centrality of identity and organizational concepts (U=313.5, p<.004) but 
not in their betweenness centrality. Identity concepts were more systematically conjured by the 
observed translocal public than organizational concepts on both Twitter and Facebook. The result 
held true, albeit to a lesser extent, even when discounting the Twitter hashtags from the analysis 
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(U=313.5, p<.029). However, identity concepts did not appear to help bridge localities in a more 
robust manner than organizational concepts. Consequently, whilst on both social media identity was 
evoked more consistently than organization, civic identity concepts seemed to help bridge localities 
on Twitter (see Tables 1 and 3) and to a lesser degree on Facebook where organizational concepts 
displayed a higher betweenness.     
 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
At the heart of the transnational locality network lay the most important political and socio-
economic urban centres in Europe and North America. The substantiation of H1 indicated that in the 
case of simultaneous protests spanning a geographically dispersed transnational network, concerns 
with protest logistics dominated communication exchanges regarding organization on both 
Facebook and Twitter (cf. Theocraris et al., 2015). However, three important qualifications apply. 
First, on Facebook, the high betweenness centrality of the organizational concepts suggested that an 
organizational frame explicating the choreography of the protests occupied an important place in 
the communication among the diasporic groups. Second, whilst locational tweets comprised terms 
that pertained to protest logistics, the same tweets very rarely cited other protest sites either in the 
diaspora or in Romania. This finding echoed the argument that on Twitter protest logistics may 
remain a topic of local concern (Conover et al., 2013b). Nonetheless, on Facebook, the 
communication of the choice to protest in front of Romanian embassies together with the 
exchanges about organizations such as Greenpeace called upon to support the protests were 
interpreted as evidence of attempts at coordinated political action.  
The same was true of the solidarity banner. In addition, the evidenced preoccupation with 
the chronicling of the protests both on Twitter and on Facebook testified to the intertwinement of 
organization and identity. The visual documentation of the events was done with the objective to 
articulate a coherent collective identity disseminated expediently on social media and beyond. 
Especially the solidarity banner was illustrative of a notion that the performance of collective 
identity necessitated systematic organizational coordination. Coordination fulfilled a strategic aim to 
paint a cohesive transnational network united against the proposed gold mine at Roşia Montană. In 
the expression of its collective identity, the diaspora appeared to seek to overcome a narrow 
portrayal of localized experience told by individual social media users. Instead, diasporic groups and 
especially their representatives, actively and over time built on their social identity to create the 
collective albeit geographically dispersed we (cf. Milan, 2015: 896). 
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The characterisation of the protests as a stand against cyanide-based gold mining resonated 
on both Facebook and Twitter. Likewise, common was the social identity premised on the 
differentiation of an out-group consisting of the mining operator and the Romanian Parliament 
which together represented an adversary against which to rally as an in-group. Contrastingly, ethnic 
inflections were particularly subdued on Facebook, the medium of choice for the diasporic groups. 
On Twitter, ethnicity was an attribute attached to the protests that was nevertheless more 
peripheral than civic concepts in the depiction of the protests. Importantly, however, whilst identity 
concepts were more systematically evoked by the observed translocal public than organizational 
concepts, they did not bridge localities to statistically significant levels either on Twitter or on 
Facebook.  
The finding that on Facebook organizational concepts were more pivotal to the connections 
between the protest locations intimated that the visibility of the protests on social media helped 
display the coordinated character of the collective action rather than the collective identity (cf. 
Milan, 2015) of the loosely organized groups in the transnational network. Facebook—and to a 
lesser extent Twitter—proved to be an instrument for exhibiting a group’s logistical arrangements 
and for achieving coordination in the absence of other organizational infrastructures (Mercea and 
Funk, 2014) such as the physical assemblies of the Occupy Movement. These findings about protests 
staged by diasporic groups targeting their homeland and not a host country government (cf. Ong, 
2003) suggest that rather than being a prerequisite to transnational activism essentialist global 
ethnicities may be conjured up strategically. This possibility and the relationship exposed between 
social and collective identity invite further longitudinal investigations into the use of social media in 
transnational activism by diasporic groups.   
As with other contemporary mobilizations, the documented protests were faced with the 
demanding task of forming catnets where pre-existing and transnational organizational networks 
were missing. Social media were an arena where this work could be conducted with variable 
intensity across protest localities. The study points to dissimilar patterns of identity and social 
organization on Facebook and Twitter. Perhaps most significantly, the research evidenced how 
localities were semantically linked together either through shared organizational concerns or 
through a focus on the defining aspects of the protests. To further distil these insights, other 
empirical enquiries might find it fruitful to combine them with a study of participant experience of 
the networked communication of protests. Facebook’s Edgerank algorithm, for instance, rank-orders 
the content in user newsfeeds to match it with previously expressed interests (Skeggs and Yuill, 
2016:389). This structural attribute of Facebook introduces a filter outside the control of even the 
keenest supporter of a protest who follows its public Facebook page. Followers of the same pages 
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may therefore develop varying perceptions of whether, for example, a possibility to enrol in 
collective action revolves on a strong attachment to an ethnic, a civic identity or a combination 
thereof.   
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Bar Chart 1:  Scaled betweenness centrality for the top ten concepts in the diasporic locality 
network on Twitter
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bar Chart 2:  Scaled betweenness centrality for the top ten concepts in the diasporic locality 
network on Facebook
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 Figure 1: Heat map visualization of betweenness centrality in the Twitter transnational locality network (centrality node and edge size and color 
gradient from dark blue to intense red) 
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Figure 2: Heat map visualization of betweenness centrality in the Facebook transnational locality network
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Table 1: Frequency count and centrality for key identity concepts on Twitter (A-Z)  
 
Table 2: Frequency count and centrality for key organizational concepts and users on Twitter (A-Z)  
 
 
Concept  Frequency Betweenness Centrality 
(unscaled) 
In-degree Centrality 
(unscaled) 
activist 140 198 74 
against 220 42 114 
cyanide 1641 568 2330 
environment 87 168 60 
Europe 416 706 296 
Gabriel 274 2045 154 
global 211 121 284 
gold 2109 62 2990 
green 49 0 24 
mining 2807 1685 4178 
parliament 502 215 500 
protest 4300 2880 3540 
quiet 484 1825 214 
resistance 1453 1766 3048 
Romanian 1609 1191 1628 
solidarity 153 1344 156 
#rosiamontana 25845 7074 29916 
#rosiamontanaint 1790 2773 1338 
#salvatirosiamontana 902 2043 1640 
#saverosiamontana 1602 2567 3618 
#unitisalvam 8454 10063 19324 
 
Concept  Frequency Betweenness Centrality 
(unscaled) 
In-degree Centrality 
(unscaled) 
action 96 22 80 
demonstration 90 370 20 
event 34 146 34 
flashmob 76 0 120 
foto 177 0 126 
join 124 105 40 
music 9 1566 4 
November 34 282 8 
petition 131 252 84 
rain 89 0 28 
square 165 167 270 
WWF 172 0 14 
yesterday 85 0 48 
 
 26 
 
Table 3: Frequency count and centrality for key identity concepts on Facebook (A-Z)  
 
Table 4: Frequency count and centrality for key organizational concepts on Facebook (A-Z)  
 
 
Concept  Frequency Betweenness 
Centrality (unscaled) 
In-degree Centrality 
(unscaled) 
activist 64 3322 188 
against 1685 915 228 
commission 774 689 20 
community 176 2415 16 
cyanide 1775 241 210 
diaspora 216 0 12 
Europe 820 149 148 
environmental 180 0 46 
exploitation 200 0 6 
fight 316 0 2 
Gabriel 548 0 6 
gold 914 0 42 
group 385 763 38 
international 308 588 12 
together 206 134 28 
 
Concept  Frequency Betweenness Centrality 
(unscaled) 
In-degree Centrality 
(unscaled) 
action 242 6076 28 
authorisation 6 3435 20 
banner 172 2811 10 
demonstration 135 1275 40 
embassy 490 4910 140 
event 1578 9506 196 
flashmob 50 0 64 
gather 121 2536 4 
Greenpeace 68 3490 8 
here 790 3213 54 
hotel 13 1531 14 
invite 191 2981 10 
join 625 3144 98 
location 473 8659 46 
morning  115 0 100 
photo 647 0 20 
protest 67 0 80 
Sunday 1046 4513 118 
today 768 2552 192 
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i Those powers included the right to forcibly resettle the population living in a mining project development 
area through compulsory purchase orders (Wong, 2013).  
ii The country had previously experienced a mining accident in the year 2000 when a tailings pond at a mine in 
Baia Mare, northern Romania, burst its banks following significant rainfall. Tailings containing cyanide and 
heavy metal seeped into the Tisza and Danube rivers leading to what was at the time “the most serious 
environmental catastrophes in European history” (Verseck, 2013).     
iii Classically defined as one’s cognizance of one’s membership of a social group, “the value and emotional 
significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1978:63) 
iv The hashtags were: #piatauniversitatii, #protestrosiamontana, #RosiaMontana, #SalvatiRosiaMontana, 
#saverosiamontana, #unitisalvam, #weloverosiamontana.  
v It should also be noted that Twitter algorithms curate the data to, for instance, actively remove spam 
messages from the stream (Burgess and Bruns, 2012). Therefore, Search API data should not be regarded as 
fully representative of communication on Twitter.  
vi In line with Carley (1997:83) I concentrate on the local network of locality concepts. In this research, the local 
network comprises all concepts directly linked to the locality concepts.  
vii In attendance were representatives for the groups from Barcelona, Berlin, Brussels, Cologne, Dublin, 
Hannover, London, Louvain-la-Neuve, Madrid, Munich, Paris, Vienna. 
viii “Unitisalvam” (in English, “united we save”) was an abridgement of the main slogan “Uniti Salvăm Roşia 
Montană”coined in the early days of the protests.  
ix The dissimilar densities of the two networks precluded a like-for-like comparison of the locality networks on 
Facebook and Twitter. Therefore, I report unscaled centrality scores for the identity and organizational 
concepts.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
